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Abstract 
 Past work related to the private prison system has focused on direct comparisons 
between private and public facilities, including their respective quality, cost-
effectiveness, and influence on recidivism. Using 2005 United States data compiled from 
a prison facility census, county census, and information on number of arrests by county, I 
examine the effect that the presence of private prisons has on the number of adult male 
arrests per county. Across four regression models, I initially find a significant effect of 
private prisons on arrests, but find that effect becomes insignificant once county and 
prison controls are accounted for. This suggests that the presence of a private prison in a 
particular county does not necessarily lead to a significant increase or decrease of arrests 
in that area. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the United States, the sharp rise in incarceration rates of the 1980s coincided 
with increasing private sector involvement in the prison system. From 1970 to 2005, the 
United States’ prison population increased by 700 percent (Public Safety Performance 
2007), and as of 2016, more than 2.2 million people resided in state, federal, and local 
institutions (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2016). This progression stemmed from major 
public policy decisions during the “War on Drugs” era of the 1970s, in which the popular 
“tough on crime” rhetoric heavily influenced laws into the 1980s and beyond. Specific 
examples include mandatory minimum sentencing laws, truth in sentencing laws, and 
three strikes laws, all of which combined to lengthen sentences, limit judges’ case-by-
case discretion, detract from rehabilitation efforts, and increase severity of punishments 
(American Civil Liberties Union 2011). 
 Today, some of the largest private prison corporations are publicly traded on The 
New York Stock Exchange (Friedmann 2015), report profits in the millions1, and account 
for 13.3% of U.S. federal prisoners and 7.3% of state prisoners (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 2015). The profit model for these corporations is dependent on high rates of 
incarceration (American Civil Liberties Union 2011) and more severe sentencing 
policies, which Corrections Corporation of America2 (CCA) concluded as a “Risk 
Related to Business and Industry” in a 2010 Annual Report. They claim that lenient 
sentencing, altered conviction and parole standards, and decriminalization each represent 
threats, and that they rely on consistency in these areas to maintain their business model 
                                                
1 Two of the largest prison companies, Corrections Corporation of America and GEO Group, reported 2016 
profits of $220 million (Core Civic 2016) and $162 million (The GEO Group 2016). 
2 Corrections Corporation of America is now known as Core Civic. 
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(CCA 2010). Supporters of the private prison industry promote increased employment 
and tax revenues generated by the presence of new facilities (Gran and Henry 2007), 
attainment of faster and cheaper bed capacity, lower operational costs, and improved 
quality of service (Bales et al. 2005). Several studies, discussed more comprehensively 
later in this paper, attempt to assess and draw conclusions regarding the viability of these 
claims. Pratt and Maahs (1999) and Pratt and Perrone (2003) explore the cost-
effectiveness and the quality of private prisons in comparison to public institutions, while 
Bales et al. (2005) determine the difference in recidivism rates between public and 
private facilities in Florida. Additionally, many academics address the debate surrounding 
private prisons, assessing the philosophical and ethical implications of a for-profit prison 
system.  
However, it appears that there are no studies to date regarding the direct effect of 
private prisons3 on arrests. This study attempts to fill the gaps in the literature and expand 
upon the impact of private prisons by measuring the strength of influence their interests 
have on society. Based on 2005 Census data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
database using regression analysis, I will specifically test whether private prison presence 
in United States counties has a measurable effect on the number of arrests of adult males 
who reside in these locations. The focus on arrests of adult males is based on contract 
                                                
3 In some cases, state and federal prisons may have operations that are managed by private prison 
companies, such as rehabilitation services, construction or financing through lease-purchasing, or medical 
care and food services (Pratt and Maahs 1999). In this thesis, however, references to private prisons refer to 
a facility that is entirely owned and managed by a single corporation, also known as “private prison 
management”.  
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prisons’4 primary incarceration population, which are short-sentence, low-security 
criminal alien adult males (Office of the Inspector General 2016). The effect will be 
measured by county, because this scope had the most available data for prisons, counties, 
and arrest rates. I hypothesize that the private prison corporations’ interest and influence 
on criminal policy (Schneider 1999) at the local, state, and federal levels may lead to 
more adult male arrests in each county. A significant effect may indicate private prison’s 
contribution to the high incarceration rates in the United States.  
I find that my results do not support my hypothesis. Descriptive statistics and my 
results my first specification initially suggest that the presence of private prisons does 
have a positive effect on adult male arrest rate by county, but the introduction of prison 
and county characteristic controls cause this effect to lose significance.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II expands upon the 
background of the private prison industry and the relevant existing literature. Section III 
describes the data. Sections IV and V discuss the empirical strategy and results, and 
section VI concludes and discusses further areas of research. 
 II. Literature Review 
The following historical background and literature review seeks to concisely 
describe the history and growth of private prisons, explore significant literature related to 
this topic, discuss philosophical and ethical arguments surrounding the use of private 
                                                
4 The official definition of contract prisons, explained further later on in this paper, defines contract prisons 
as facilities run by private prison corporations whose services and beds are contracted out by state 
governments or the Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2016) 
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prisons, and finally to investigate the private industry’s relation to politics and lobbying 
tactics. I discuss each in turn.   
II. a) Historical Background 
Government contracts with private prison companies for adult facilities first were 
introduced in the 1980s, an opportunity that new private companies took advantage of 
during an era of prison overcrowding. The first arrangement was through Hamilton 
County, Tennessee in 1984, when the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) went 
under contract with the government to run the facility there. Another major deal involved 
four Texas institutions in 1988, where the Department of Corrections agreed to contracts 
with the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and Wackenhut Corrections 
Corporation5 (WCC) (Harding 2001). Federal and State departments became willing to 
contract with private companies due to the potential that private agencies could construct 
and run prisons at a higher level of quality, efficiency, and, most importantly, at a 
cheaper cost than public agencies could (Perrone and Pratt 2003). This option was highly 
attractive for federal and state agencies at a time when alleviating the cost burden of 
long-term and high volume incarceration became a necessity (Pratt and Maahs 1999).  
The pressure to lower costs and prison populations is still relevant in the modern 
era, exemplified through the May 2011 Supreme Court case Brown v. Plata, which 
ordered California to alleviate its overcrowded prisons (Brickner and Diaz 2011). This 
case demonstrates the continuous need for private companies to take part in the prison 
system, assuming that they can provide the cost savings they advertise. A more debatable 
reason as to why the government would contract with private prisons is the perception 
                                                
5 Wackenhut Corrections Corporation is now known as The GEO Group after a name change in 2003. 
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that private prisons would provide higher quality facilities in the face of deteriorating 
public prisons, which is not entirely true in all cases. Pratt and Maahs (1999) argue that 
while some public facilities are in severe decline, others are clean, state-of-the-art 
institutions (Pratt and Maahs 1999).  
Government contracts with third-party companies stem from the expectation that 
private facilities are superior to public institutions in terms of quality, efficiency, and 
cost. In the next section, I explore the existing literature, which examine the validity of 
these assumptions.  
II. b) Existing Literature 
Several studies question the legitimacy of arguments in support of private prisons, 
and therefore challenge the purpose of government contracts with these corporations. 
Pratt and Perrone (2003) examine both the quality and cost-effectiveness of private 
facilities compared to public institutions. This work reviews past empirical studies that 
relate to this topic to determine whether private facilities operate with higher quality 
and/or at a cheaper cost than public facilities. Pratt and Perrone (2003) discuss the 
methodological issues with past studies, and attempt to come to conclusions regarding the 
question at hand. They find inconclusive data about effectiveness (measured by relative 
safety and order of the facility) and cost-effectiveness, finding that many of the past 
studies use inconsistent methods. They conclude that neither supporters nor those who 
oppose private prisons should use the data from these past studies to support their claims, 
because when aggregated, the data is inconclusive in both categories. Pratt and Maahs 
(1999) also find that there is no overall significant or long-term cost savings for private 
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over public prisons. These studies challenge arguments in support of private prisons 
regarding cost-effectiveness and quality. This may indicate the need for federal and state 
governments to further examine empirical research before engaging in additional private 
industry contracts.  
Bales et Al. (2005) conduct a study regarding recidivism6 rates of public versus 
private inmates in Florida state prisons. They seek to address the claim that private 
prisons reduce inmate recidivism, and do so by comparing and analyzing multiple 
treatment groups of private and public prison inmates. Using a wider range of recidivism 
covariates than prior studies, Bales et al. (2005) find that there are no significant 
recidivism rate differences between private and public inmates for adult males or 
females, or for juvenile offenders. This study refutes yet another argument made in 
support of the private prison system, and therefore supports the position that this industry 
does not necessarily deliver the entirety of what it promises. 
II. c) Philosophical and Ethical Arguments  
Those in opposition to private prisons find several philosophical and ethical 
drawbacks to this system including their for-profit business model, insufficient 
programming for prisoners, lack of transparency, and issues with training and safety 
measures.  
A key philosophical standpoint views prison as the fundamental responsibility of 
a government that should not be shifted to a third-party. Harding (2001) states that one 
may view prison as a primarily state function because of the government’s direct 
                                                
6 Recidivism is defined as the tendency of a convicted criminal to reoffend. 
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responsibility to its citizens, both the incarcerated and the free. Therefore, leaving control 
of this responsibility in the hands of the private sector, which is likely not motivated by 
people’s best interest, is a potential disservice to society.  
Perhaps the most obvious ethical argument against private prisons is that they 
seek to earn profits, which they acquire from filling bed quotas with more prisoners for 
longer periods of time (Schneider 1999). Many of the contracts private prisons form with 
the government guarantee 80 to 100 percent of the facility’s beds will be filled with 
prisoners, in an arrangement called a “bed guarantee” (Bowling 2013). The most 
interesting and concerning aspect of these contracts is that if the state does not fulfill the 
agreed upon quota, it must pay a fee to that private company whether the beds have 
prisoners in them or not (Bowling 2013). This arrangement means that the federal and 
state governments may have increased incentives to arrest more citizens and subsequently 
send them to the private facilities to avoid paying this fine. 
 The private prison model also has the potential to take away what some might 
argue is one of the key purposes of prison, which is to rehabilitate inmates. Rehabilitation 
programs such as drug counseling, mental health care, and job training are not primary 
priorities for private prisons (Brickner and Diaz 2011), because these programs detract 
from profits. Withholding these programs may negatively affect inmates, who are 
impeded from receiving any pre or post-release rehabilitation benefits potential programs 
would offer.  
Lack of transparency is also an issue discussed regarding private prisons. Brickner 
and Diaz (2011) argue that it is difficult to analyze the operations of private prison 
facilities, because they are not held to the same standard of transparency as public 
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institutions. They cite past examples of private companies resisting Freedom of 
Information Act requests, and describe how this contributes to a culture of secrecy and 
lack of protection against corrupt processes. Additionally, Gran and Henry (2007) 
establish the issue that private prison administrators are held to a less strict standard than 
public officials, as they are not elected, appointed, or impeachable. This means that any 
wrongdoing is not directly available to be addressed by the public, and lowers the 
chances of any repercussions against administrators’ misconduct. Additionally, the media 
has restricted direct access to the owners of these facilities as well as to their records, 
which further limits public knowledge of private prison practices.  
A key procedural issue within private prisons involves staffing and training issues 
as a result of cost saving measures. It is common for private facilities to experience high 
turnover amongst its employees, most commonly due to lower salaries and benefits than 
those earned by employees in public facilities (Blakely and Bumphus 2004). The private 
sector pays new officers about $5,327 less than the public sector pays their new 
employees, and the difference in maximum salary is about $14,900 (Blakely and 
Bumphus 2004). High turnover, at a rate of 53% for private facilities and 16% for public, 
indicates unstable conditions that lead to lower quality supervision and increased safety 
concerns (Brickner and Diaz 2011). For example, the private sector experiences more 
than twice the number of assaults against inmates than the public sector, and just as many 
inmate-on-staff assaults (Blakely and Bumphus 2004). Similarly, Gran and Henry (2007) 
support these findings of high turnover rates among private facility staff, and also 
describe the tendency for these employees to have fewer credentials, less training, and a 
general lack of experience and specialization of prison knowledge as their public prison 
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counterparts. Additionally, both Brickner and Diaz (2011) and Gran and Henry (2007) 
describe prisoner escape scandals that occurred in private facilities, attributing these 
incidents to the substandard security efforts implemented in these institutions.  The 1998 
escape of six prisoners from an Ohio correctional facility (Gran and Henry 2007) and the 
2010 escapes of three prisoners in Arizona that led to the murder of an Oklahoma couple 
(Brickner and Diaz 2011) exemplify just two incidents that imply the danger poor 
training and security can pose to society. 
 The trends in the private sector are concerning, as they suggest a lower standard 
of quality, transparency, and safety than that of public facilities. Although there are safety 
concerns in public facilities as well, the fact that there are less stringent standards for 
training and expertise in private institutions indicates potentially lower quality service at 
the expense of both prisoners and the public. These findings are relevant to my analysis 
because they indicate the detrimental profit-seeking behavior of the private sector, which 
arguably leads to both cut corners and a skewed motivation to perpetually increase the 
incarcerated population.  
II. d) Political Influence 
The growth and performance of private prisons appears to vary by presidential 
administration policy as well. To visually represent this, Figure 2 displays the stock price 
of two of the biggest private prison corporations over the past ten years. The stock of the 
GEO Group and CCA dipped to their lowest in January of 2008 and August of 2016. In 
2008, Barack Obama had just been elected as president, which may have created 
unknowns for stockholders unsure of a president associated with the democratic party. 
The connection between presidential policy and industry are much clearer in 2016, during 
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which Barack Obama announced that the United States would be phasing out the use of 
private prisons due to questionable safety and security issues (Savage 2016). Conversely, 
October and November 2017 represent the beginning of a sharp increase of GEO and 
CCA stock, a response that corresponded directly to Donald Trump’s victorious 
presidential campaign. This may be due to Trump’s open support (The New York Times 
2017) for private prisons, as well as his tough on crime attitude, which aligned well with 
the private industry agenda.  
Tough on crime policies generally benefit elected officials’ political agendas. This 
is due to the potentially increased support they may earn from the public for seeking 
harsher punishment on crime, without incurring any backlash from those actually 
receiving the punishment, the prisoners (Schneider 1999). For those elected who support 
prison reform, it is an uphill battle, as prisons are rarely a high priority for voters and 
prison reform proposals are often voted down (Harding 2001). This trend benefits private 
prison companies, which profit from society’s perception of ever-increasing crime rates 
in the United States, and the resulting need for more prisons to combat this. 
Brickner and Diaz (2011) describe in great detail past corruption scandals, which 
involve private prison lobbyists illegally influencing the actions of elected officials. In 
2011, for example, it was revealed that a Juvenile Court Judge, Mike Ciavarella, had been 
involved in a longstanding scheme in which he was paid by private prison officials to 
sentence juveniles to harsher sentences. This scheme demonstrated that the temptation of 
profit was enough to corrupt the justice system and affect the lives of the juveniles 
sentenced by this judge. This case demonstrates the power that private companies have, 
and the danger of involving a party motivated by profits into the criminal justice system. 
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The connection between private prison money and public policy was also revealed in 
Arizona under Governor Jan Brewer. In this case, individuals associated with private 
prisons made hefty donations to Brewer’s campaign, and it was found that several 
members of her staff were in contact with private prison lobbyists (Brickner and Diaz 
2011). A policy outcome most likely influenced by these connections was Governor 
Brewer’s signing of a law that increased implementation of immigration law, and 
therefore would have increased incarceration of undocumented immigrants (Brickner and 
Diaz 2011). This would directly benefit private prisons in Arizona, as this is their most 
common inmate population. Additionally, a Petteruti and Ashton (2011) revealed another 
example of private prison campaign influence, exposing The GEO Group’s $1.5 million 
in donations over the course of seven years, from 2003 to 2010. These donations likely 
were made to politicians who already supported the private industry or who were being 
convinced to do so, which is problematic in a system that should respond to the desires of 
government officials’ constituents, not those of the officials themselves.  
 These examples demonstrate how the private prison industry fluctuates according 
to certain policies and the general political climate, which is why it is in their interest to 
attempt to influence those in power through legal or illegal lobbying and financial tactics. 
The scandals described above are just some of the incidents uncovered in the past, which 
suggests that there may be more corruption still undiscovered regarding the private prison 
industry. The political influence of private prisons is relevant to this analysis, because a 
correlation between private industry and arrests may signify corruption consistent with 
the incidents described above. A relationship between private prisons and arrests possibly 
suggest similar lobbying and bribery tactics to those they engaged in in the past. 
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Existing literature to date has explored comparisons between private and public 
institutional efficacy. However, a lack of research relating to private prisons’ 
questionable profit motivations and methods as well as past corrupt behaviors indicates 
opportunity for further analysis. This study aims to approach this topic by examining the 
direct effect of private prisons on arrests based on their motivated to fill beds with 
prisoners for profit.  
III. Data  
I use data from three merged sources that include information on prison facilities, 
county characteristics, and adult male arrest rates. There are 12077 facility observations 
across 506 counties. The first dataset documents prison facilities from counties across the 
United States, drawn from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) database. The second 
dataset, from the United States Census Bureau, contains demographic, macroeconomic, 
and public goods information about all counties in the United States. The final dataset 
provides the number of arrests by age, sex, and race in each county. Because this thesis 
solely focuses on adult male arrests, this is the only category extracted and merged with 
the prison and county data. Additionally, the year 2005 is examined because it reflects the 
most recent prison facility information available, and will therefore provide the most 
relevant results.  
Excluded from the prison data are Military facilities, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) Institutions, Bureau of Indian Affairs facilities, US Marshals Service 
institutions, juvenile facilities, and private facilities not primarily for State or Federal 
                                                
7 All facilities that did not have a primarily adult population were dropped from the dataset, which 
decreased the total number of observations by 471.   
 17 
inmates (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005). Some of these exclusions contribute to 
limitations of this data, because they decrease the number of private prisons available for 
analysis. For example, many private facilities seek to incarcerate Mexican immigrants 
with immigration offenses (Office of the Inspector General 2016), meaning that ICE 
facilities often contract with private companies. Excluding ICE facilities therefore, will 
eliminate a number of relevant private contracts from this analysis. Additionally, the 
exclusion of certain types of private facilities will similarly eliminate a portion of private 
prisons, which may affect the results of this analysis. Another drawback to this dataset is 
that the observations are dated, as the most recent prison census data collected was in 
2005. Growth or decline of the private prison industry in the 12 years since this collection 
date may change results of this analysis. 
The dependent variable in this analysis measures the number of adult male arrests 
per county. The main variable of interest is an indicator variable for private prisons, equal 
to 1 if the prison facility is private and 0 if the prison facility is state or federal. I also 
include a number of prison and county characteristics. Prison characteristic variables 
include whether inmates pay a fee for their imprisonment, the total number of inmates in 
each facility, and an indicator variable for prison work programs (equal to 1 if the prison 
facility has a work program and 0 if it does not). There are also multiple county 
characteristic variables that fall under macroeconomic, demographic, and public goods 
categories. See Table I for a full list of variables and their respective definitions, 
including both prison and county characteristics.  
 
 18 
III. a) Summary Statistics 
Appendix Table II presents descriptive statistics by type of prison facility. The 
mean and standard deviation of adult male arrests for exclusively private facilities was 
much higher than the total or public means. This indicates that on average, arrests of 
adult males are higher in counties with private prisons, which supports my original 
hypothesis. Further testing must be conducted to analyze the significance of this effect. 
The averages and standard deviations are also higher for private than public 
facilities for inmate fee payment and for number of non-citizen inmates. This suggests 
that inmates pay fees more often in private prisons, and the number of non-citizen 
inmates is higher in private prisons. This is unsurprising, because inmate fees are utilized 
in private prisons to offset the cost of housing inmates (Eisen 2014) and non-citizens are 
generally private prisons’ target population (Office of the Inspector General 2016). It is 
also found that private prisons have fewer inmates on average than public institutions, 
and that the presence of a work program is consistent across both private and public 
facilities. The finding regarding work programs is surprising, because it was a previous 
hypothesis of mine that private facilities were more likely to require compulsory inmate 
work due to ties to prison industry programs, such as the Federal Prisons Industries 
initiative, UNICOR8. However, this is untrue because UNICOR’S programs are 
implemented through the Federal Bureau of prisons, so both private and public 
institutions utilize work programs.  
                                                
8 UNICOR, a federally owned program that implements prison labor in the United States, provides work to 
inmates within the Federal Bureau of Prisons.  
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When examining the means and standard deviations of the various County 
Characteristics, specific elements stand out. The total, private, and public means and 
standard deviations are fairly consistent for most variables. However, the average 
percentage of people who graduated high school or higher is slightly less for counties 
with private facilities than those with public institutions, but only by two percentage 
points. A larger sample size might indicate whether or not this is a significant difference. 
Another key finding reveals that the county population was much larger for private 
institutions than for public facilities, which may indicate that private companies look to 
operate in more populated areas. Additionally, it appears that there are more 
supplementary income recipients in counties with private prisons, yet fewer social 
security recipients in these counties than those with public facilities.  
The remainder of the paper formally analyzes the aforementioned patterns.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy  
To analyze the impact of private prisons on adult male arrest rate, I estimate the 
following model: 
Acf = α + β1Pcf + β2Ncf + β3Ycf + εcf      (1) 
where c and f represent the observed county and prison facility, respectively, A is the 
number of adult male arrests; P  is an indicator variable for the presence of a private 
facility;  N is a vector of prison controls including a dummy for whether inmates pay a per 
diem fee, total number of number of inmates in each facility, number of incarcerated 
noncitizens, and a dummy variable for the presence of a prison work program; Y is a 
vector of demographic, public good, and economic county controls including percentage 
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of adults, education levels, the foreign population percentage, per capita income, 
percentage of homeowners, persons in poverty, the ratio of males per 100 females, social 
security recipients, Medicare beneficiaries, and supplementary income recipients, and 
unemployment rate; and ε is an error term with the usual properties. Originally, two 
additional county variables were to be included into the regressions. The first was a 
variable that listed the number of hospitals in each county, and the second variable 
accounted for the percentage of the county population employed in manufacturing jobs. 
However, both of these variables included missing data, so they could not be included in 
the regression models. This may be an area of further research if more complete data can 
be collected from recent years. 
 I estimate four different specifications to determine if the effect found in the 
descriptive analysis persists after I control for prison and county characteristics.  
Specification 1 replicates the results presented in the descriptive analysis and simply 
controls for an indicator variable for type of prison facility.  Specification 2 includes 
Specification 1 plus it controls for prison characteristics (P). Specification 3 includes 
Specification 2 plus county fixed effects, to account for the possibility that I may not 
include the full set of county controls. Finally, Specification 4 includes Specification 2 
plus the county variables (Y). 
V. Results 
 Appendix Table III presents the results from Specifications 1 through 4.  There 
are several noteworthy patterns.  First, there is a significant positive correlation between 
the presence of private prisons and adult male arrests (see Specification 1), which 
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supports the earlier findings mentioned in the descriptive statistics. However, this effect 
does not persist once prison characteristics (Specification 2) and county characteristics 
(Specifications 3 and 4) are included in the analysis. The finding in Specification 1 
supports the hypothesis that private prisons play some significant role in the amount of 
arrests per county, most likely due to the fact that private companies profit from more 
prisoners to fill beds, as the aforementioned literature supports. However, the loss of this 
significance across the other specifications contradicts this hypothesis. The significant 
variables that cause this loss of significance across specifications are mostly rational, and 
are described below. 
 Prison characteristics in isolation find two significant variables, which may 
contribute to the loss of initial significance of private prisons on arrests found in 
Specification 1. The number of noncitizens and the presence of a work program are 
significant and positively correlated with arrests at the five and one percent levels 
respectively. The results indicate that for every one noncitizen incarcerated, about ten 
more arrests can be expected, and the presence of a prison work program predicts about 
21,200 fewer arrests. This number seems incredibly high, especially since the average 
number of arrests per county is only about 10,400. However, this may be a valid result 
because a facility that has a work program may release prisoners who are able to find 
employment more easily upon release, which may lead to fewer arrests in that county. 
Interestingly, both these effects disappear in Specification 3 following the addition of 
county fixed effects, and inmate fee is instead significant. This indicates that if a prison 
requires inmates to pay a fees while they are incarcerated, it is expected that there will be 
about 2,500 additional adult male arrests in that county. This is a rational result due to the 
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fact that facilities earn profits from prisoners, so they may have a vested interest in a 
greater number of prisoners, as a result of more arrests. Specification 4 found no 
significance in any of the prison characteristics. 
 Specification 3 is the equivalent of Specification 2, with the additional inclusion 
of all county fixed effects. This regression has the highest adjusted R squared value of the 
four models, at 95.8%. This means that all of the independent variables included account 
for 95% of the variance in arrests, indicating that county variables play a large role in the 
arrest rates per county. In terms of significant variables, the relationship between private 
prisons and adult male arrests maintains no significance.  
With the inclusion of my specific county characteristics in this Specification 4, it 
appears that all of the significance of the prison characteristics become non-significant. 
However, there are some county characteristics that are significantly correlated with 
arrests at the one and five percent levels. One surprising result indicates that with every 
additional percentage point of adults in a certain county, it is expected that there will be 
about 525 fewer arrests of adult males in that county. This result seems counterintuitive, 
where I might predict that a higher number of adults residing in the county would mean 
more arrests of adults in that area. However, more adults may mean more two-parent 
households within that county, which often is an indicator of stability, and would signal a 
fewer number of arrests. Other surprising results included the finding that counties with 
higher foreign population correlated with fewer arrests. However, the foreign population 
variable does not indicate whether the person is simply born into a different country, or if 
they are still a noncitizen, which makes these results somewhat unclear. It also appears 
that for each additional percentage of a county population that is educated at a high 
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school graduate level and above, there are about 200 fewer arrests in that county, which 
is a reasonable result. Another predicted result is that every additional homeowner 
corresponds to about 250 fewer arrests per county. This is a rational result because more 
homeowners indicate financial stability, which is generally true in more affluent areas 
with less crime and fewer arrests. The adjusted R-squared for this model is much higher 
than the previous Specifications 1 and 2, at 82.9%. This indicates that the independent 
variables explain the variation in arrests per county quite well.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The involvement of the private sector within the United States prison system is a 
highly controversial topic. Supporters of this design argue the advantages of private 
prisons over public institutions, citing improved quality, efficiency, and cost-
effectiveness. However, much of the literature on this topic challenges the validity of 
these claims, and questions the incentives of private prison corporations. The foundation 
of this study revolves around the problematic and self-serving motives of private prisons, 
which profit by filling beds with prisoners. I hypothesize that private prisons may seek to 
earn greater profits by influencing policy towards increased arrests. This would benefit 
the private prison industry, while simultaneously contributing to high incarceration rates 
and adding little to no value to society. Specifically, this study seeks to analyze the effect 
of private prisons on arrests per county.  
My analysis of the data regarding prisons, counties, and arrest rates has shown 
that in the simplest case of Specification I, the presence of private prisons does have an 
effect on the arrest rates of adult males by county. This finding supports my hypothesis 
stated in the introduction of this paper. However, after accounting for controls for both 
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prison characteristics and county characteristics, it appears that the correlation between 
private prisons and arrests is no longer significant in any of the other three cases. This 
may have changed in the years since the release of this data, which could be an area of 
further research once additional data has been released on years subsequent to 2005. This 
is especially true considering the fact that private institutions made up a small percentage 
of my overall data, so more recent data might reflect an increase of facilities and 
therefore show a larger effect on arrests. The private prison industry, especially since the 
recent transition of presidential administrations, may be seeing more growth in the future. 
Private corporations have much to gain from the continued expansion of prisoners, which 
some might refer to as the prisoner “market” (Schneider 1999). This attitude towards 
prisons is deeply disturbing, and makes it worthwhile to perform further research on the 
effects of this industry on arrest rates.  
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VII. Tables 
Table I: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable	  Name	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Variable	  Description	  
Adult	  Male	  Arrests	   Total	  number	  arrests	  of	  adult	  males	  in	  each	  county	  
County	  	   County	  in	  which	  facility	  resides	  
State	   State	  (abbreviated)	  in	  which	  each	  facility	  resides	  
Prison	  Characteristics	   	  
Private	  Prison	   =1	  if	  facility	  is	  private,	  0	  otherwise	  
Inmate	  Fee	   =1	  if	  inmates	  pay	  a	  per	  diem	  fee,	  0	  otherwise	  
Number	  of	  Inmates	   Total	  inmate	  population	  within	  facility	  
Male	  Facility	   =1	  if	  facility	  houses	  only	  males,	  0	  otherwise	  
Number	  of	  non-­‐citizen	  inmates	   Number	  of	  noncitizens	  present	  in	  facility	  
Facility	  Work	  Program	   =1	  if	  facility	  has	  a	  work	  program,	  0	  otherwise	  
County	  Characteristics	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  Adults	   Percentage	  of	  adults	  aged	  15	  to	  64	  
Education	  	  	  
Percentage	  in	  each	  county	  who	  are	  high	  school	  graduates	  or	  
higher	  
Foreign	  Population	   Percentage	  of	  county	  population	  	  
Homeowners	   Percentage	  of	  housing	  units	  occupied	  by	  owner	  
Per	  Capita	  Income	   Personal	  income	  per	  capita	  (dollar)	  	  
Medicare	  Recipients	   Persons	  enrolled	  in	  Medicare	  (Rate	  per	  100,000)	  
Persons	  in	  Poverty	  	   Percentage	  of	  persons	  in	  poverty	  
Population	   County	  population	  
Males	  to	  Females	   Number	  of	  males	  per	  100	  females	  
Social	  Security	  Recipients	   Social	  Security	  program	  beneficiaries	  (Rate	  per	  100,000)	  
Supplementary	  Income	  Recipients	   Supplemental	  Income	  program	  recipients	  (Rate	  per	  100,000)	  
Unemployment	  Rate	   Unemployment	  rate	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Table II: Summary Statistics 
 
Mean and Standard Deviation 
Variable Total Private Public 
Adult Male Arrests 
10452.85  
(30814.46) 
17995.05 
(55120.59) 
9715.60 
(27217.04) 
Prison Characteristics     
Inmate Fee  
0.114 
(.320) 
.712 
(.455) 
.056 
(.229) 
Number of Inmates 
1087.92 
(966.63) 
854.32 
(845.61) 
1112.24 
(975.50) 
Male Facility 
0.849 
(.359) 
.649 
(.479) 
.869 
(.337) 
Number of non-citizen 
inmates 
90.23 
(262.52) 
271.69 
(690.20) 
71.34 
(152.01) 
Work Program 
0.986 
(.118) 
.939 
(.241) 
.991 
(.095) 
County Characteristics 
Percentage of Adults 
67.35 
(2.89) 
66.74 
(3.33) 
67.41 
(2.84) 
Education 
77.24 
(8.56) 
75.97 
(10.35) 
77.37  
(8.35) 
Foreign Population 
4.63 
(5.65) 
5.78 
(7.32) 
4.51  
(5.44) 
Homeowners 
71.95 
(7.81) 
69.98 
(8.76) 
72.15 
(7.68) 
Per Capita Income 
28143.05 
(7457.56) 
27923.12 
(8170.52) 
28165.99 
(7382.93) 
Medicare Recipients 
15782.77 
(4338.14) 
15320.72 
(3941.38) 
15830.87 
(4376.23) 
Persons in Poverty 
14.25 
(5.10) 
15.89 
(5.82) 
14.08 
(5.00) 
Population 
240514.6 
(755645.5) 
389577.8 
(1361399) 
223322.4 
(658169.3) 
Males to Females 
103.11 
(13.55) 
103.47 
(16.95) 
103.07 
(13.16) 
Social Security 
Recipients 
18526.03 
(4622.16) 
17773.5 
(4446.20) 
18604.37 
(4635.04) 
Supplementary Income 
Recipients 
2676.32 
(1696.09) 
2936.68 
(2009.66) 
2649.68 
(1659.46) 
Unemployment Rate 
5.21 
(1.71) 
5.06 
(1.78) 
5.23 
(1.70) 
N=1207 
Notes: Standard Deviations 
presented in parenthesis 
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Table  III: Regression of Private Prison Presence, Prison Variables, and County Controls on Adult 
Male Arrests 
  
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Private Prison 
8239.44*** 
(3099.89) 
4067.22 
(3936.89) 
746.42 
(1342.76) 
153.011 
(1677.61) 
Prison Characteristics     
Inmate Fee -  
4062.95 
(3450.84) 
2533.02** 
(1139.53) 
-1353.76 
(1464.13) 
Total Inmates -  
1.59 
(1.07) 
.4041 
(.3596) 
.0563 
(.4616) 
Number of Noncitizens -  
10.47** 
(4.77) 
-.7304 
(1.654) 
2.60 
(2.04) 
Work Program -  
-21238.11*** 
(7537.00) 
-705.59 
(2401.03) 
587.09 
(3181.45) 
County Characteristics     
Percentage of Adults -  -  - 
-525.19** 
(205.66) 
Education -  -  - 
-155.30* 
(86.54) 
Foreign Population -  -  - 
-566.31*** 
(118.37) 
 Homeowners -  -  - 
-250.81*** 
(71.36) 
Per Capita Income -  -  - 
-.102 
(.0802) 
Medicare Recipients -  -  - 
-.5742** 
(.225) 
Persons in Poverty -  -  - 
-130.15 
(178.01) 
Population -  -  - 
.0383*** 
(.0006) 
Male to Female Ratio -  -  - 
-37.24 
(40.39) 
Social Security Recipients -  -  - 
.1514 
(.2480) 
Supplementary Income Recipients -  -  - 
.0227 
(.4658) 
Unemployment Rate - - - 
-182.78 
(270.59) 
Constant 
9715.60*** 
(927.18) 
27981.93*** 
(7588.1) 
12658.85*** 
(3757.39) 
84260.12*** 
(18818.27) 
County Fixed Effects No No Yes No 
Observations 1207 1207 1207 1207 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.005 0.021 0.958 0.8297 
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01,**p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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VIII. Figures 
 
Figure 1. United States incarceration rate from 1980-2005 
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Figure 2. CCA (CXW) and GEO stock prices 2007-2017 
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